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ARTICLE
Preemption and Federalism:
The Missing Link
By

PAUL WOLFSON*

Introduction
As a weapon against state economic and social regulation, the preemption doctrine threatens to become the new Lochner.1 As the states
take up much of the regulatory power that Congress has forsworn,2 corporations are advancing the Supremacy Clause 3 as an obstacle to state
regulation in fields such as environmental protection,' employment discrimination,' labor law,6 nuclear power,7 workplace safety,8 and securities.9 The courts have had many opportunities to develop a readily
applied preemption doctrine. Preemption cases have reached the
Supreme Court frequently because they have often come within the
*

Associate, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, D.C., J.D. Yale Law School,

1987. The author wishes to thank Betsy Cavendish, Michael Froomkin, and Paul Kahn for
their many helpful comments and suggestions.
1. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (New York statute limiting bakers to 60
'hour work week violated Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
2. See, eg., Can-Do Capitals: States Enlarge Roles As Congress Is Unable To Solve
Problems, Wall St. J., June 28, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
3. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
4. See California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 107 S. Ct. 1419 (1987); International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. 805 (1987).
5. See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987).
6. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
7. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190
(1983).
8. See Note, Getting Away with Murder: Federal OSHA Preemption of State Criminal
Prosecutionsfor IndustrialAccidents, 101 HARV. L. RaV. 535 (1987).
9. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987); Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction."0 When it can do so, the Court
usually bases its rulings on preemption rather than other constitutional
provisions because preemption cases concern congressional intent, and
therefore Congress can overturn the Court's interpretation if the Court is
mistaken." Yet frequent opportunities to refine .preemption doctrine
have not yielded a consistent jurisprudence.
Although the Supreme Court has referred to four categories of preemption in almost every one of its recent preemption cases, 1 2 the catego10. Until-recently, parties could appeal of right to the Supreme Court fromfederal appellate decisions striking down-state statutes as."repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws
of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (1982), and from state court decisions upholding
state statutes against a supremacy clause challenge, 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1982). The Supreme
Court has recently heard several preemption cases on appeal. See, e.g., Goodyear Atomic
Corp. v. Miller, 108 S.Ct. 1704, 1708 (1988); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 107 S.Ct.
2211, 2214 (1987); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 962 (1986);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 738 (1985). Congress recently eliminated most of the Supreme Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction. See Pub. L. No. 100352, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 102 Stat. 662.,

11. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983); Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132,
137-38 (1982). The Court occasionally has given the impression of reaching out for the preemption issue even when the claim was not raised and considered below. See, e.g., Capital
Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crigp, 467 U.S. 691, 697-98 (1 9 94); Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 382 & n.6 (1983); Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. at 137 n.5.
This practice enables the Court to avoid constitutional issues on which there is no consensus.
See, e.g., Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S at 146 (unanimous ruling on supremacy clause issue made
moot claim that state program excluding recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) from receiving emergency cash assistance violated Equal Protection Clause).
Compare Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984) (unanimous resolution on
preemption issue made moot question whether state statute prohibiting broadcast of liquor
advertisements violated First Amendment) with Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 106
S. Ct. 2968 (1986) (five-to-four split on whether Puerto Rico statute restricting advertising of
casino gambling violated First Amendment). The Court's reliance on congressional willingness to overturn mistaken cases of statutory interpretation has been severely criticized in several contexts. See, e.j, Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1472-73 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). See generally Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress to
Control the Future, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185, 211 (1986).
12. The cases usually contain some version of the following:
It is well established that within constitutional limits Congress may preempt state
authority by so stating in express terms. Absent explicit preemptive language, Congress' intent to supersede state law altogether may be found from a "'scheme of
federal regulation... so pervasive as to-make reasonable the inference that Congress
left no room for the States to supplement it,' because the 'Act of Congress may touch
a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system willbe
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject,' or because 'the
object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.'" Even where Congress has not entirely
displaced state regulation in a specific area, state law is preempted to the extent that
it actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict arises when "compliance with
both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility," or where state law
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."
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ries are useless in difficult cases. It is often. hard to determine which
category governs a particular case. One-of the nation's eminent appellate
judges recently wrote, "We are somewhat wary that these ready citations
list, but do not describe, and catalog, but do not define,, any real distinctions among the various types of preemption." 3
The Supreme Court's failure to appreciate the link between preemption and the Constitution is the chief cause of the defects in preemption
doctrine. This Article explores ways in which that link might be restored. Part One examines the salient difficulties with the Supreme
Court's current preemption jurisprudence. First, the Court's cases holding that state laws must fall if Congress has"'occupied the field" of legislation have failed to provide courts with adequate guidance for
determining whether a field has been occupied. Second, the Court's pronouncement that state laws must yield if they "stand as an obstacle" to a
congressional objective is functionally indistinguishable from the Court's
holding that state laws are ousted when Congress "occupies the field,"
although the Court treats the two rules as separate bases, for preemption.
The "stands as an obstacle" test also forces the courts either to search
quixotically for the "spirit" of a statute, or to choose'between two doctrinally deficient theories of preemption, which I shall-call the "floor, not
ceiling" theory and the "delicate balance" theory.
Part Two discusses the roots of this dissonance in preemption, particularly the Court's reluctance to consider preemption doctrine as. an
aspect of constitutional law and its preference to treat preemption as an
exercise in statutory interpretation. Part Two argues that preemption
cases raise important questions about the nature of federalism under our
Constitution and present delicate questions concerning the legislative
Pacific Gas & Elee. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 203-04 (1983) (citations omitted). For other recent incantations of the test, see, California
Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 107 S. Ct. 1419, 1425 (1987); International Paper Co. v.
Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. 805, 811 (1987); California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct.
683, 689 (1987).
Justice White listed four types of preemption in Pacific Gas & Electric: express preemption, "leaving no room" preemption (known as "occupying the field" preemption in other
cases), physical impossibility preemption, and obstacle preemption. But citing Pacific Gas &
Electric in a later case, Justice White found only two general types of preemption, one with
two subtypes. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984). Justice Marshall
identifies three types of preemption. See Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 689. One commentator agrees
with Justice Marshall but suggests that one type has two sub-types. Note, The Burger Court
and Preemption Doctrine: Federalism in the Balance, 60 NOTRE'DAME L. REV. 1233, 1235
(1985).
13. Palmer v. Liggett Group, 825 F.2d 620, 624 (1st Cir. 1987) (Brown, J.). See also
Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Railroad Comm'n, 833 F.2d 570, 573 (5th Cir. 1987) ("these guides are
easier to state than to apply....").
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process and administrative discretion. Finally, Part Two considers preemption as constitutional law in light of how far preemption doctrine has
strayed from the Framers' understanding of relations between the federal
government and the states.
Part Three suggests four ways in which the courts could restore the
link between preemption and the Constitution. First, the courts might
adopt a two-tiered approach to preemption under which statutes enacted
pursuant to heavy federal interests would enjoy greater preemptive force
than other federal laws. Second, courts could act to ensure that plaintiffs
relying on preemption doctrine are not trying to revive dormant commerce clause restrictions on state power. Third, courts should view preemption invoked by administrative agencies more critically. Finally,
courts should require Congress to state explicitly its intention to preempt
state laws outside those areas where the Constitution gives the federal
government exclusive power.
I.
A.

The Preemption Puzzle

Occupying the Field

Few preemption cases, and even fewer difficult ones, present situations in which state and federal laws actually conflict.14 Many preemption cases involve federal and state regulations of the same subject that
are motivated by the same purposes, with the state regulation going "further" than the federal law.15 The parties challenging such state regulation usually argue that Congress has precluded any further state
regulation by legislating comprehensively in the field. This type of preemption is called "occupying the field" 16 or "leaving no room" for the

states.17
"Occupying the field" cases pose at least two definitional difficulties
for the courts. First, what is the field? Second, what determines whether
or not it is occupied? This Article is concerned with only the latter question as it touches more directly on fundamental issues concerning the
allocation of power under the Constitution.
When a court finds that Congress has occupied a field, it holds that
the states are completely barred from regulating in that area. Courts bar
14. For an example of an easy case, see Rose v. Arkansas State Police, 479 U.S. 1 (1986).
15. See California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S.Ct. 683, 689 (1987); Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 241 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,dissenting); Cloverleaf
Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 172-73 (1942) (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
16. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
17. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. at 230.
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state regulation not because the Constitution gives Congress certain exclusive powers such as the foreign affairs power,'" or power over immigration,1 9 but because Congress has deemed it necessary and proper to
exclude the states from a particular area. Congress may occupy a field
even when it seems unlikely that the operation of state law would disrupt
the regulatory scheme Congress has established.
The first of the Court's modem preemption cases, CloverleafButter
Co. v. Patterson,0 provides an example. In Cloverleaf Butter, the
Supreme Court held that pervasive federal regulation of butter manufacturing precluded further state regulation in the field. Butter manufacturing is not an area for which the Constitution requires a single, uniform
rule, provided solely by the federal government. How, then, did the
Supreme Court conclude that Congress intended to exclude the states
entirely? The Court noted that the Department of Agriculture had been
given authority to protect consumers' interests "throughout the process
of manufacture and distribution," and that the Department had regulated "such minutiae as the clean hands of the employees and the elimination of objectionable odors."'" In short, the Court concluded that the
existence of broad and detailed regulatory authority in the hands of the
federal government was inconsistent with any regulation by the states.
The Court did not look to any statutory language expressing the intent to
prevent state regulation; instead, the Court was persuaded that the detailed statutes and regulations that the federal government had established precluded interference by the states."2
The idea that a complex federal scheme could be disrupted by the
mere existence of state legislation has a certain logical appeal. For example, Congress could conclude, as it has in the field of employees' retirement and health benefits, that the burden of complying with regulation is
so heavy that parties should have to follow only one set of laws. In that
field, however, Congress has expressly stated that state laws are preempted. 3 Without an explicit statement by Congress, courts are faced
with a highly subjective question: how "complex" must a federal scheme
be for a court to conclude that state law is preempted? This question,
18. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
19. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
20. 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
21. Id. at 168.
22. For a more recent case employing an approach similar to CloverleafButter, see City of
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1973).
23. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 107 S.Ct. 2211 (1987) (discussing preemption
under Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982
& Supp. 1985)).
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however, misses the point. Preemption is a matter of congressional intent to preempt state law, not a matter of legislative complexity.2 4 The
complexity approach to "occupying the field" does not address Congress'
intent to preempt state law. Instead, this approach forces courts to balance federal and state laws and to hold state laws preempted when the
courts conclude: (a) a scheme of regulation is so broad and detailed as to
be comprehensive, and (b) because the scheme is comprehensive, any further regulation by the states would disrupt Congress' general vision for
the field.
In some recent cases, the Supreme Court has abjured the Cloverleaf
Butter approach and has declined to acknowledge the comprehensiveness
of administrative regulations as a factor favoring preemption. The Court
has reasoned that administrative agency regulations are always more
complex than statutes, for they are intended to address issues in greater
detail.2 5 Moreover, Justice Powell once wrote for the Court that the
comprehensive nature of the federal work-incentive statute governing recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) did not
require preemption of similar state provisions, because most modem social and regulatory problems require complex treatment. 26 But one recent case, InternationalPaper Co. v. Ouellette,27 suggests that the Court
has not given up on the complexity argument altogether. In Oullette, the
Court was loath to find that Congress had occupied the entire field of
water pollution regulation. Nevertheless it concluded that the comprehensiveness of the federal scheme of environmental regulation required
preemption of state nuisance actions, as additional state regulation would
interfere with federal administrative uniformity. 2 Thus, comprehensiveness may or may not be a factor favoring preemption, prompting one
court of appeals to state that "preemption is not to be inferred merely
from the comprehensiveness of the federal scheme."2 9 The comprehensiveness approach evidently does not provide much guidance.
24. See, e.g., Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 107 S. Ct. 2211, 2216 (1987) (focus of
preemption doctrine is congressional intent); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471
U.S. 724, 747 (1985); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984); Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983); see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-

25, at 480 (2d ed. 1988) (preemption issue "largely a matter of statutory construction").
25. See California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 107 S. Ct. 1419, 1426 (1987);
Hillsborough County Fla., v. Automated Medical Labs, 471 U.S. 707, 718 (1985).
26. New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 415 (1973); accord
De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 359-60 (1976).
27. 107 S.Ct. 805 (1987).
28. Id. at 813.
29. Automated Medical Labs v. Hillsborough County, Fla., 722 F.2d 1526, 1531 (11th
Cir. 1984) (emphasis added), rev'd, 471 U.S. 707 (1985).
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B.

Standing as an Obstacle: The "Delicate Balance" Theory

1.

The Development of the Theory

Even if Congress has not occupied a field, a state law may be preempted if it "stands as an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."" ° Although this type of preemption now poses a-significant
threat to the states' regulatory authority, the phrase "stands as an obstacle" was originally used merely to describe existing doctrine.
In the standard recitation of preemption tests repeated in Supreme
Court opinions, the "stands as an obstacle" prong is usually followed by
a citation to Hines v. Davidowitz.3 Hines v. Davidowitz was an "occupying the field" case. Davidowitz challenged Pennsylvania's alien registration law, requiring him to carry an identification card at all times, as an
encroachment on Congress' power to regulate immigration. A threejudge district court held the Pennsylvania alien registration law unconstitutional. Congress passed a federal alien registration act during the pendency of Pennsylvania's appeal to the Supreme Court; therefore, the
focus of the appeal shifted from the existence of constitutional restraints
on Pennsylvania's power to require alien registration to the preemptive
effect of the federal statute. The two statutes were not in actual conflict;
the state was not prohibiting something required by the'federal government nor vice versa. The Court indicated, however, that the absence of
actual conflict could not be dispositive on the preemption issue. The real
question was whether the Pennsylvania law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress. "32

As a rule of decision for 'preemption 'ases, the "stands as an obstacle" formula exists at a lofty level of generality. Particularly when read
in the context of the Davidowitz opinion, it is clear that the formula was
not intended to advance a new test for preemption. It merely restated
30. For lower court cases recognizing the "standing as an obstacle" approach as a distinct
prong of preemption doctrine, see Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1111 (4th
Cir. 1988); Massachusetts Medical Soc'y v. Dukakis, 815 F.2d 790, 791 (Ist Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 229 (1987).
31. 312 U.S. 32 (1941). See, eg., Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302, 2306 (1988); Silkwood
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561
(1973).
32. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. at 67 (footnote omitted). Some commentators viewed
Hines v. Davidowitz as the fountainhead of a period of expansive construction of preemption
doctrine, which ended with De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (California statute prohibiting employment of undocumented aliens not preempted by federal immigration law). See Catz
& Lenard, The Demise of the Implied FederalPreemption Doctrine, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
295, 306 (1977). Reports of preemption's-demise, like those of Mark Twain's death, have been
greatly exaggerated.
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the tests that the Court had previously advanced to assess preemption,
tying together the "actual conflict" prong with the "occupying the field"
prong.
Hines v. Davidowitz was rarely cited until the "stands as an obstacle" issue reemerged twenty years later in FloridaLime & Avocado Growers v. Paul.3 3 FloridaLime & Avocado Growers was the Supreme Court's
foray into the long and bitter war between California and Florida agricultural interests over California's attempt to exclude Florida avocados.34 The majority held that the California law did not stand as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress' purposes and objectives.35
The majority understood its analysis simply to embrace two long-standing preemption tests: the existence of an actual conflict between federal
and state laws, and the occupation of an entire field by Congress.36 The
FloridaLime & Avocado Growers majority used the phrase "stands as an
obstacle" much as the Davidowitz majority had used it, as a catchall referring to the general spirit of preemption.
The dissenters in FloridaLime & Avocado Growers, however, introduced a new aspect to preemption doctrine that may yet prevail as the
great hope of opponents of state economic regulation. The dissenters
concluded that even without total occupation of the field, Congress had
preempted state law because its purpose in enacting federal standards
was to establish uniform standards of avocado quality throughout the
nation.37 Uniformity in commerce represented a strong federal interest
because "[flack of uniformity tends to obstruct commerce, to divide the
Nation into many markets."3 8 Thus the dissenters drew on themes from
dormant commerce clause jurisprudence3 9 (one purpose of the Commerce Clause being the establishment of a national common market)' to
conclude that state economic regulation could not coexist with federal
regulation in the avocado field.
33. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
34. California prohibited the sale of avocados that were less than eight percent oil by
weight, on the theory that avocados picked with too little oil were underripe and failed to
mature after picking. Florida avocados were already subject to federal marketing orders that
gauged maturity without regard to oil content. Many Florida avocados were ripe under federal regulations but not under California law. Id. at 133-34.
35. Id. at 141.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 169 (White, J., dissenting).
38. Id.

39. See id. (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
40. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 803 (1976). See also McLeod v. J.E.
Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944).
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The dissenters' move was subtle but significant. The regulation of
avocado quality was not a field where state regulation was absolutely
barred; federal interests did not clearly predominate, and the very nature
of the field did not require uniformity. *l Nor was avocado quality a field
expressly occupied by Congress. The dissenters suggested that even absent a clearly, expressed congressional intent to preempt the field, courts
might conclude that some federal regulation requires the ouster of parallel state legislation. Following the dissenters' view, courts should hold
that state laws are preempted whenever the federal government strikes a
particular balance among competing considerations that could be upset
by more stringent state regulation.4 2
The Court has never really repudiated the view of the FloridaLime
& Avocado Growers dissenters, and it has used "delicate balance" language in subsequent majority opinions. Indeed, the notion that state
laws should be preempted when Congress has struck a "delicate balance" 43 among competing interests in a particular field may have great
appeal for those advocating judicial restraint. To a court that believes
that social policy decisions are best made by a legislature representing
various, competing interests, legislation appears as a package of compromises that could be untied through judicial interference. The arguments in favor of preempting state laws that could disrupt the delicate
balance effected by Congress closely resemble the arguments against implying rights of action for money damages: Congress has surveyed the
area; given a realistic view of the legislative process, as dominated by
competition among interest groups, what Congress has not legislated is
surely as important as what Congress has legislated; and state legislation
41. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. at 144 (majority noting that
"the supervision of the readying of foodstuffs for market has always been deemed a matter of
peculiarly local concern").
42. As discussed infra, in text accompanying notes 66-68, it is often quite difficult to distinguish an "occupying the field" argument from a "delicate balance" argument. For example,
in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973), the Court held that Burbank's ordinance prohibiting jet aircraft takeoffs from Burbank airport was preempted by the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and the Noise Control Act of 1972. After discussing the "pervasive" control of aircraft flights by the federal government, 411 U.S. at 638, a factor relevant to
"occupying the field" analysis, the Court stressed that the Federal Aviation Act had established a "delicate balance" between safety and efficiency. Id. The Court may have found that
Congress occupied the field because it had strnck a "delicate balance" between the two most
important factors. The Court's preemption analysis in City of Burbank was further complicated by its suggestion that Congress had expressly preempted local curfews of aircraft flights,
id. at 634-37 (quoting legislative history), and that Burbank's ordinance conflicted with a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) order, id. at 626 n.2. Rather than rely on these more
direct avenues of preemption analysis, the Court chose the more meandering "stands as an
obstacle" road. Id. at 639.
43. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. at 638-39.
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should not disrupt the outcome of the legislative process by speaking
when Congress has been silent.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Justice Powell, who opposed the
implication of rights of action from federal statutes as an intrusion on the
legislative domain,' favored preemption to protect a delicate balance set
by Congress.' The majority opinion written by Justice Powell in InternationalPaperCo. v. Ouellette is an excellent recent example of the "delicate balance" theory.4 6 The Court recognized that the federal Clean
Water Act had not occupied the entire field of water pollution regulation.4 7 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that by setting up an elaborate
permit system for the discharge of polluting effluents, Congress had established a delicate balance that should not be upset by the application of
Vermont law. The language of the majority opinion is a classic expres-

sion of the view that legislation comprises a package of compromises.48
Ouellette represented a victory for a preemption theory that had
been rejected at least twice by the Supreme Court in the previous three
years. 49 Five years earlier in Edgar v. MITE Corp., three Justices had
advanced this "delicate balance" theory, with only slight success. 5" But
44. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth.'v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 14-15
(1981); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-48 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
45. The theme of balancing ran throughoutf Justice Powell's jurisprudence. See generally
Kahn, The Court, The Community and the Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice
Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1 (1987).
46. 107 S. Ct. 805 (1987). Ouellette involved an attempt by Vermont residents to proceed
under Vermont nuisance law against an International Paper Company plant in New York.
47. Id. at 812.
48. "Congress implicitly has recognized that the goal of the [Clean Water Act]-elimination of water pollution-cannot be achieved immediately, and that it cannot be realized without incurring costs." Id. at 813.
49. See Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Labs, 471 U.S. 707, 720-21
(1985) (rejecting view that federal regulation of blood plasma production had struck a particular balance between plasma safety and availability); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S.
238, 250-52, 256 (1984) (rejecting Justice Powell's dissenting argument that state cause of
action for exposure to plutonium taken from nuclear plant interfered with balance between
nuclear development and public safety struck by federal administrative agency).
50. 457 U.S. 624, 630-34 (1982) (plurality opinion by White, J., joined by Burger, C.J.,
and Blackmun, J.) Chief Justice Burger, Justice White, and Justice Blackmun concluded that
an Illinois antitakeover statute upset the balance Congress struck through the Williams Act
among the interests of investors, management, and the takeover bidder. The preemption theory of the MITE plurality failed to command a majority of the Court, and the Court later
adopted a quite different interpretation of the Williams Act. In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987), a majority of the Court concluded that the Williams Act
was intended to rotect investors from the 'pressures of tender offers, not promote investor
"autonomy" from both management and tender offerors. Compare Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457
U.S. at 639-40 (plurality opinion) (Williams Act intended to make investors "free to make
their own decisions") with CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1646
(1987). The Court thus discarded the approach of the MITE plurality, with its "delicate bal-
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in the labor field the "delicate balance" theory has scored a significant
victory. The doctrine of "Machinists preemption" 51 currently protects
the balance established by Congress between management and labor in
the collective bargaining process by precluding state regulation of the
peaceful economic weapons available to both sides. 2 The Court adopted
Professor Archibald Cox's view 3 that in matters of labor disputes generally, Congress has struck a "balance of protection, prohibition, and laissez-faire." 5 4 As a result of "Machinists preemption," the states'
authority to regulate peaceful union activity is quite limited.
The Court has also been willing to conclude that a balance struck by
an administrative agency preempts state legislation. Administrativeance" implications. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. ofAm., 107 S. Ct. at 1654-55 (White,
J., dissenting) (arguing that Indiana statute protects shareholders as a group, whereas Williams
Act protects right of individual shareholders to make decisions).
51. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 750-51 (1985); Lodge
76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132
(1976).
52. "Machinists preemption" had its origin, as did "delicate balance" preemption generally, in an "occupying the field" case. Cf supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text (discussing Hines v. Davidowitz). In that case, Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964),
the Supreme Court held that the states could not prohibit striking unions from pressuring the
management of other companies to, boycott a struck employer. The Court concluded that
Congress had occupied the field of secondary strike activity, so the states were not free to
impose any further restrictions on union activity in that area. Id. at 258-59. Machinists,which
followed Teamsters, did not involve secondary strike activity.
53. Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1337, 1352 (1972).
54. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 140 & n.4. The Court took a tremendous leap from holding
that the small field of secondary boycotts was occupied to concluding that Congress had established a delicate balance for all collective bargaining activities. Balancing preemption also
emerged in one of the most widely noted preemption cases in the courts of appeals, Palmer v.
Liggett Group, 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987). In Palmer, the First Circuit held that a state
cause of action against tobacco producers based on the duty to warn of the risks of smoking
was preempted by the federal Cigarette Labelling Act's requirement of specific warning labels
on cigarette packages. The First Circuit noted that Congress had explicitly stated that the
labels represented a balance between health and commerce. Permitting a plaintiff to proceed
against tobacco companies on a theory of failure to warn could lead to jury verdicts against
tobacco companies even when the companies had complied with federal labelling law, and thus
could lead to more stringent cigarette labelling standards imposed as a matter'of state common
law. 825 F.2d at 627.
For an arguably contrary view, compare Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d
1108 (4th Cir. 1988). In Abbot, a child sued the manufacturer of a diph'theria-tetanus-pertussis
vaccine on a state law theory of breach'of implied warranty, encompassing failure to warn.
Federal regulations required certain labelling of the potential adverse reactions associated with
the vaccine's use, and these labels, once approved, could not be changed without federal approval. See id. at 1112. The Court did not consider the effect that a judgment on the failure to
warn theory might have on the content of the labels. Federal law may have expressly allowed
the states flexibility in this area, however. See id. at 1117 (Wilkins, J., concurring) (federal law
establishes rebuttable presumption that warnings are adequate if they comply with federal
regulation).

V
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balancing preemption is initially surprising because the "delicate balance" theory rests largely on the idea that political decisions made by
Congress to accommodate competing interests in a particular way should
not be upset by the states. In the classical view of administrative law,
Congress makes the overarching political decisions, leaving the agencies
to fill in the details. 5
Of course, the agencies frequently balance competing political interests. 6 The Court still attempts to mask this reality in preemption cases,
however, by describing the function served by the agencies as what might
be called "technical balancing," i.e., reconciliation of difficult but lowlevel considerations such as cost and timing.5 7 Technical balancing allows the Court to justify preemption in the name of administrative efficiency and uniformity. Justice Powell justified preemption in Ouellette
precisely along these lines,5 8 and he urged the same view in California
Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co.59 and Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp.6 0 Yet the technical balances struck by the administrative agencies
overseeing particular programs often reflect important political decisions,
and the states might well interfere with these decisions by regulating the
same field. For example, in approving rates for interstate sales of power,
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) makes decisions
that might appear impenetrably technical to many, but these decisions,
which indirectly affect the price that consumers pay for power, often
have profound political repercussions and are the subject of intense lobbying and litigation by utilities and consumer groups. Thus by precluding the states from setting even intrastate wholesale power rates, the
Court prevents the states from achieving a different balance than the one

struck by FERC.61
2.

The Unraveling of the Theory

If this concept of regulation as a delicate balance among competing
interests comports with suspicions about the reality of the legislative and
55. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 745-49 (D.D.C. 1971) (three-judge court).
56. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 3:3, 3:5 (2d ed. 1978).

57. See, e.g., Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 321
(1981); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 177-78 (1978).
58. See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. 805, 813-14 (1987).
59. 107 S. Ct. 1419, 1433-34, 1436, 1437 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60. 464 U.S. 238, 281-83 (1984) (Powell, J., dissenting).
61. See Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 106 S. Ct. 2349 (1986). But cf New
Orleans Pub. Serv. v. Council of New Orleans, 833 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1987) (states retain
authority to set intrastate retail rates for electricity).
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administrative processes, then what is wrong with it? If courts gave preemptive effect to every federal regulation reflecting such a balance, state
laws would soon be preempted in almost every field imaginable. Consider, for example, the preemption claim recently advanced to, but rejected by, the First Circuit in Massachusetts Medical Society v.
Dukakis.6 2 Under the federal Medicare system, a Medicare carrier reimburses doctors either on the basis of an itemized bill or on the basis of the
assignment of the patient's right to payment from the carrier. When a
doctor chooses the assignment method, Medicare pays him directly for
eighty percent of a "reasonable charge." The doctor may then seek the
remaining twenty percent of the reasonable charge from the patient but
may not seek payment above any reasonable charge. Under the itemizedbill method, however, the doctor obtains his fee from the patient, not
Medicare, and Medicare implicitly permits the doctor to "balance bill"
the patient, or to seek payment above the reasonable charge.63 Balance
billing under the itemized bill method thus allows the doctor to weigh
the risk of patient nonpayment against the reward of obtaining more
than a reasonable charge. Massachusetts prohibited doctors from balance billing the patient even under the itemized-bill method.
The doctors' organizations argued that the state was interfering with
the balance that Congress had established through Medicare. The federal
government had intentionally given the doctors two options for billing,
yet the state took one of those options away. This state interference altered the balance struck by Medicare between affordability (ensuring that
elderly patients can afford their medical bills) and access (ensuring that
doctors will not stop taking Medicare patients because the doctors feel
underpaid)." 4 The doctors' argument made a great deal of sense. Compromises between affordability and access run throughout Medicare.6 5
The problem with balancing preemption is simple but vexing. If, as
we suspect, virtually every federal regulatory statute reflects a delicate
balance among competing interests, and if the courts conclude that such
a balance should have preemptive effect, the states would soon be left
with only a tiny amount of legislative authority. The "delicate balance"
theory overlooks one of the most obvious characteristics of federalism:
62. 815 F.2d 790 (1st Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 229 (1987).
63. 815 F.2d at 793.
64. The court's opinion indicates that it would not deny that the Massachusetts rule
might be preempted if doctors actually became disenchanted with Medicare because of the ban
on balance billing. The court found it difficult to believe that doctors were actually abandoning Medicare because of the balance billing restriction. Id.
65.

(1982).

See generally P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE
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at least two levels of legislative activity, federal and state, operate in this
country. Congress' decision to strike a particular balance on the federal
level does not' necessarily mean that it is unwilling to have the balance
altered by the states.6 6 Proponents of the "delicate balance" theory
might argue, in reply, that if the states are allowed to alter the balance
struck by Congress, then there is no reason for Congress to strike a
balance.67
Simply put, a conclusion that Congress has established a balance
among competing interests that requires preemption has the identical effect as a conclusion that Congress has occupied the field. If Congress has
occupied the field, then the balance it has struck cannot be altered by the
states, and the states are divested completely of authority in that subject
area. If, however, Congress has not occupied the field but continues to
operate under the assumption that state legislatures continue to pass laws
and state administrators continue to issue regulations,6 8 "delicate balance" preemption requires the irreconcilable positions that (1) Congress
has -struck a general balance that the states must not undo but (2) the
states may continue to pass laws affecting the field of legislation. The
only way to resolve this conundrum is to reconvert "delicate balance"
preemption back into "occupying the field"-that is, to mark out a minifield that Congress has preempted.
This is precisely what the Court has done recently with "Machinists
preemption." "Machinists preemption" rests on the assumption that the
National Labor Relations Act struck a particular balance between management and labor, and among protection, prohibition, artd laissezfaire.69 Virtually every state law touching on the subject of employment
66. See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 240 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 655 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgmet).
,
67. There is also tension between "delicate balance" preemption and the currently prevailing jurisprudence about implied private rights of action in federal statutes. The modem cases
in the latter field are governed by the four-factor analysis of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78
(1975). The last prong of the Cort test asks, "is the cause of action one traditionally relegated
to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to

infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?" Id. This prong suggests that, in areas
where state and federal authority overlap, federal courts should take care that federal law does
not disturb the balance that the states have established.
68. This assumption is not just a fiction. Many members of Congress serve in state government before running for Congress, and they undoubtedly have a solid grasp of the range of
substantive regulation in effect, at least in their home states.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
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can affect this balance.7" Appreciating the potentially drastic impact of
"Machinists preemption" on state labor legislation, employers began to
argue that a broad range of such legislation, such as laws giving unemployment benefits to strikers,7 1 requiring employers to provide health
care benefits to their employees, 72 and mandating severance pay after
plant closings,7 3 altered the balance struck by federal labor law. In response, the Court retreated, holding that the federal balance governs only
the collective bargaining process and does not apply to what one might
call "substantive" employment regulation such as minimum wage laws
or employment security provisions.74 Essentially, the Court abandoned
the "balancing" basis of Machinists preemption and instead carved out a
6mall field for Congress to occupy.
C. Not Standing as an Obstacle: "Floor, Not Ceiling"
"Delicate balance" preemption has not had the field to itself. On
the contrary, it has been overshadowed lately by the concept that federal
statutes generally operate as a floor below which state regulations may
not drop, not a ceiling above which they may not rise.75 The most recent
manifestation of this theory is Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court in
California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra.7 6 In Guerra,
the petitioners argued that California's statute requiring unpaid leave for
pregnant workers was preempted by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(PDA), which requires that women affected by pregnancy be treated "the
same" as other disabled but nonpregnant employees.77 In light of the
"remedial purpose of the PDA"7 and the goal of Title VII (of which the
PDA is a part) "to achieve equality of employment opportunities and
70. Justice Powell expressed concern on this subject in Machinists. Lodge 76, International Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 156
(1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
71. See New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
72. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
73. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 107 S.Ct. 2211 (1987).
74. See, e.g., id. at 2222-23; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. at 75458. For a case involving a similar retreat, see CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107
S. Ct. 1637, 1647 (1987) (remarking that if the Court held that delay in takeovers occasioned
by Indiana's anti-takeover statute warranted preemption, it would call into question "a variety
of state corporate laws of hitherto unquestioned validity").
75. For an older example of the "floor, not ceiling" theory, see Colorado AntiDiscrimination Commission v. Continental Air Lines, 372 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1963).
76. 107 S.Ct. 683 (1987).
77. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
78. Guerra, 107 S.Ct. at 691.
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remove barriers that have operated in the past,"7 9 the Court concluded
that California's pregnancy leave policy was consonant with the animating spirit of the PDA.
Similarly, in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,80 decided
during the same Term as Guerra, the Court upheld Indiana's takeover
statute because it "further[ed] the federal policy of investor protection"
codified in the Williams Act.8 Two terms earlier, the Court relied on
similar reasoning to uphold a Florida county's ordinance regulating
blood plasma production as not preempted by Food and Drug Administration regulations.8 2 In the plasma case, the Court concluded that the
federal regulations merely established minimum safety standards, and
that the states were free to impose more stringent standards.83
To many, the "floor, not ceiling" theory may represent precisely
how preemption should operate. As a vision of federalism, this view parallels Justice Brennan's campaign for the protection of individual rights
by state constitutions beyond the guarantees afforded by the federal Constitution.84 In preemption doctrine, however, the "floor, not ceiling" approach has difficulties as yet unresolved by the Court.
First, to be successful, this approach depends on the use of creative
methods of statutory interpretation usually viewed with great suspicion
by the Supreme Court. In Guerra, for example, the Court had to get
around the problem that the PDA requires pregnant employees to be
treated "the same" as disabled, nonpregnant employees. If the Court
had decided that the same meant absolutely "the same," California's
79. Id. at 693 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971)). The
PDA is actually an amendment to Title VII. See 107 S. Ct. at 687 n.6.
80. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
81. But cf Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A
Comment on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 101 HARV. L. REV. 96, 110-16
(1987). Professor Langevoort, who takes a skeptical view of the Court's analysis in CTS, argues that the Court's preemption analysis shifted from a "broad interpretive approach" to
strict constructionism between Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) and CTS.
Langevoort, supra, at 112. This roughly parallels a shift from the "stands as an obstacle"
prong of preemption to inquiring whether an "actual conflict" existed. But regardless of which
analysis it used, the Court had to ask what the policy of the Williams Act was before deciding
whether it preempted state laws. If the Court had decided that the Williams Act established a
"delicate balance," it could much more easily have held that the Act preempted state antitakeover laws. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 261-63 (7th Cir.
1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). If, on the other hand, the Williams Act has the policy of
establishing a "floor" for investor protection, then under current preemption doctrine, most
state statutes furthering the same policy must be valid.
82. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Labs, 471 U.S. 707 (1985).
83. Id. at 721.
84. See generally Brennan, State Constitutionsand the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
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statute might well have been preempted. 5 The Court had to abandon
what has become its dominant rule of statutory interpretation, that the
plain language of a statute will ordinarily resolve a controversy, 86 and
rely instead on the underlying purposes of the statute. As the Guerra
court stated, "a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not
within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention
of its makers." 8 7 Such reliance on the policy behind the statute, instead
of on its language, is rare for the present Court88 and, in the context of
Title VII, provoked a storm of protest from the dissenters later in the
term.8 9

A second problem is that emphasizing the spirit rather than the letter of the laws can lead courts to make simplistic and naive conclusions
about legislative intent. In some cases, like those involving Title VII, the
Court may concentrate on the purpose instead of the language of the
legislation to make clear that the statute should be applied with reference
to simple and abiding principles. But the Court does federal courts and
private parties a great disservice when it oversimplifies statutes like the
Williams Act by stating that the federal policy is merely "investor protection." These clumsy interpretations provide ammunition for opponents of "judicial activism" who argue that courts are ill-suited to make
social policy, and bolster the suspicion that the courts have only a loose
grasp of complex and delicate matters such as corporate takeovers. Such
vague statements also support the rationale behind "delicate balancing"
theory, that the difficult process of accommodating society's wants and
needs is best left to Congress, and that once Congress has struck that
balance, the courts should vigorously enforce it.
Furthermore, the "floor, not ceiling" approach encounters insuperable difficulties when Congress is explicit (or honest) about striking a balance among competing interests. Consider, for example, the two similar
85. The majority in Guerra did not believe this would be the case, however, because California's pregnancy-leave policy did not require employers to treat pregnant employees better
than nonpregnant ones; it simply required employers to offer leave to pregnant employees.
Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 694-95. See generally Note, Employment Equality under the Pregnancy
DiscriminationAct of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929 (1985).
86. See generally Note, Intent, ClearStatements, and the Common Law. Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. RV. 892, 894-98 (1982). But see Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 517, 533 (1988) (arguing that reliance on purpose rather than
words of rule is "current paradigm of American statutory interpretation" and citing several
examples of reliance on purpose rather than words, including Guerra).
87. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 691 (quoting Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979)
(quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892))).
88. See Note, supra note 86.
89. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1471-75 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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cases of Michigan Canners & FreezersAssociation v. AgriculturalMarketing & BargainingBoard",and Hayfield Northern Railroadv. Chicago &
Northwest TransportationCo.9 Michigan Canners involved a conflict between the federal Agricultural Fair Practices Act and Michigan's Agricultural Marketing" and Bargaining Act. The federal act, which was
designed in part to help American farmers in their economic relations
with powerful food processors, permits farmers to market their produce
through agricultural cooperatives. The Michigan act took this policy a
step further by requiring farmers to abide by a contract negotiated by a
cooperative if that cooperative controlled more than fifty percent of total
production.9 2 The state act could have assisted the Michigan farmers
significantly in their dealings with food processors.93 The Supreme
Court held the Michigan law preempted, noting that Congress had specifically prohibited the coercion of farmers to join cooperatives. 94 Congress had heard testimony from representatives of food processors who
stated that an agricultural cooperative can attain a monopoly position to
the detriment of consumers. 95 In short, the federal act bolstered the
power of the farmers a bit, but not too much.
In Hayfield Northern Railroad,9 6 decided the day after Michigan
Canners, the Court considered a preemption challenge to the use of Minnesota's eminent domain power by commercial shippers to obtain control
of the track on unprofitable rail lines that freight railroads wished to
abandon. The rail carriers hoped to pick up the track for redeployment
on profitable lines. The process by which such lines could be abandoned
and redeployed is comprehensively governed by the federal Staggers Rail
Act, which permits shippers to offer to subsidize unprofitable lines that
carriers seek to abandon. The Staggers Act prescribes an administrative
procedure by which the parties can bargain for a price, or if they fail to
agree on a price, can have the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
97
establish a price.
Eminent domain power gave Minnesota shippers a second bite at
the apple: they could participate in the ICC proceeding, withdraw, and
90. 467 U.S. 461 (1984).
91. 467 U.S. 622 (1984).
92. 467 U.S. at 464-68.
93. Undoubtedly, more cynical explanations could be advanced for the policy, such as
capture of the Michigan legislature by agricultural cooperatives that themselves had become
powerful.
94. 467 U.S. at 473-74.
95. Id. at 472.
96. 467 U.S. 622 (1984).
97. Id. at 629-30.
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then try for a more favorable price in state courts.9 8 Although the Staggers Act fairly explicitly attempts to balance the traditionally adversarial
interests of shippers and railroads, the Supreme Court declined to hold
that the state eminent domain action interfered with the operation of the
Staggers Act.
Anticipating that the Court might reject their version of the "delicate balance" theory, the railroads also argued that the Staggers Act was
animated by an overall purpose "to make the railroad industry more efficient and productive." 99 If the Staggers Act set a "floor" of railroad
efficiency below which the states' could not drop, the exercise of the Minnesota eminent domain power plainly had to give way. But to this argument, the Court replied that the Staggers Act did not have such, an
overarching purpose. Indeed, the Staggers Act is filled with legislative
recognition of considerations other than efficiency, such as the competing
interests of the shippers."° The railroads could not win with either the
"delicate balance" theory or the "floor, not ceiling" theory.
When cases such as Michigan Canners and Hayfield Northern Railroad, presenting similar issues, are decided unanimously, yet with opposite results, there is a flaw either in the rule or in its application. As
noted earlier, courts and commentators consistently state that the measure of preemption is congressional intent to preempt state law.101 Yet
the opinions in preemption cases oddly measure effects or, more precisely, they compare the effects of the state laws with the purposes of the
federal laws. The courts avoid the central question, whether Congress
intended to oust state law, and rather examine what general purposes
Congress intended its legislation to have in the subject area and consider
whether the state law interferes with these purposes in any way.
98. See id at 636 (acknowledging this point).
99. Id. at 636-637 n.15., The Court suggested that the ICC's price determination might
have res judicata effect oh the state court but declined to so hold and "intimate[d] no position
on the issue inasmuch as it is not now before us." Id. The Court instead indicated that the
question presented was better analyzed in terms of resjudicata than preemption. Id. The case
was similar to the "filed rate" cases in which the Supreme Court has held that rates for the sale
of power approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) are binding on
state judicial and administrative proceedings. See, e.g., Nantahala Power & Light Co. v.
Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953 (1986). The Court should have decided the res judicata issue, for if
the ICC determination Was res judicata, then the state court proceeding was a mere formality.
If, on the other hand, the ICC determination was not a binding adjudication, then the Court
should have faced more squarely the possibility that state eminent domain power interfered
with the objectives of the Staggers Act.
100. 467 U.S. at 636.
101. See supra note 24; see also Langevoort, supra note 81, at 110; Note, supra note 8, at
541.
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This approach may be entirely appropriate if there is a claim of conflict between federal and state law. If the laws actually conflict, the state
law must fall. The state law would fall, however, not because of a congressional intent to preempt, but because of the Supremacy Clause itself.
But true preemption is more subtle, and more powerful, than simple operation of the Supremacy Clause. Preemption rests on the idea of (for
lack of a better term) a "preemptive strike" against state laws before they
conflict with federal law. There need be no actual conflict for the state
law to be preempted;1" 2 there need only be an "interference" or an "obstacle." In many cases, "interference" exists only at the level of broad,
simplistic characterizations of congressional intent.'
As will be explained in Part Two, this understanding of preemption is at odds with
conceptions of federalism prevailing now and when the Constitution was
framed.
II.

The Missing Link

Although the effect of a preemption is to prevent a state from enforcing its laws, preemption cases rarely indicate that the doctrine implicates the very structure of federalism established by the Constitution.
The courts repeatedly state that preemption cases are decided by the intent of Congress."° Professor Tribe similarly assures us that preemption
cases "may pose complex questions of statutory construction but raise no
controversial issues of power." 105 Yet preemption does implicate controversial issues of power because of its similarity to a power that the Framers denied Congress: the power to veto state laws. 10 6 Preemption
doctrine as a surrogate for the rejected congressional veto undermines
the political safeguards of federalism built into the Constitution.
102. For an example of analysis that confuses "standing as an obstacle" with "actual conflict," see Note, supra note 8, at 541, 548-49.
103. See infra text accompanying notes 165-75.
104. See supra note 24.
105. L. TRIBE, supra note 24, § 6-25, at 479.
106. See THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DE-

BATES 27, 29-30 (R. Ketcham 1987); THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 200-01 (A. Hamilton) (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961) [hereinafter all citations to The Federalistare to the C. Rossiter 1961 edition] (state laws not to be ousted by a "mere possibility of inconvenience in the exercise of
powers, but an immediate constitutional repugnancy that can by implication alienate and extinguish a pre-existing right of sovereignty"); THE FEDERALIST No. 34, at 206 (A. Hamilton)

("there is no power on either side to annul the acts of the other"); Carey, James Madison on
Federalism: The Searchfor Abiding Principles, 3 BENCHMARK 27, 29-30 (1987).
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Preemption Doctrine and the Congressional Veto

The idea of a congressional veto over state legislation first emerged
at the Constitutional Convention as part of the Virginia Plan, introduced
on May 31, 1787. A clause of the Virginia Plan giving Congress the
power to "negative all State laws contravening in the opinion of the
Nat[ional] Leg[islature] the articles of Union" passed the Committee of
the Whole House without debate or dissent.10 7 A week later, however, a
move to replace the clause with a more forceful one, granting Congress
the power to "negative all laws which to them shall appear improper"
failed by a vote of seven to three, with only the large states of Virginia,
Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts voting in favor.108 The Convention
was apparently not stirred by Madison's warning that a congressional
veto was essential to prevent the encroachment of the states on the federal government.10 9
Those Convention delegates suspicious of increased federal powers
saw two dangers in the congressional veto. First, Congress might not
understand the individual states' needs in regulating purely local matters
and thus might veto state laws imprudently. Second, large states might
use the veto to further their own sectional ambitions at the expense of
other states. Elbridge Gerry, of Massachusetts, noted that the various
states "have different interests and are ignorant of each other's interests." 110 Hugh Williamson, of North Carolina, pointed out that
whatever powers Congress might have in issues of national concern, the
states ought to possess independence in purely local affairs.1"' Gunning
Bedford, of Delaware, was even more direct in his suggestion that large
states such as Pennsylvania and 12
Virginia would use the congressional
veto to "crush" the small states."
One of Madison's comments suggests that the congressional veto
was simply the wrong solution to an admittedly important problem.
Madison was concerned that state judges, who were bound to enforce
state laws, would fail to give effect to federal law." 3 The New Jersey
107. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 54 (M. Farrand ed. 1937)
[hereinafter M. FARRAND].
108. 1 id at 162-63.
109. 1 id.at 164-65.
110. 1 id.at 166.
111.

1 iadat 171.

112. Iid. at 167.
113. Iid. at 169. This problem, of course, is precisely what the modem Supremacy Clause
addresses, requiring that the judges in every state be bound by the supreme law of the land.
U.S. CONST. art. VI. The role that Madison envisioned for Congress in controlling state courts
has largely been assumed by the Supreme Court through its exercise of jurisdiction over appeals from state supreme courts, see Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816);'
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Plan, a counterattack by delegates opposing a strong national government, addressed the problem in a proposal that closely resembles the
modern Supremacy Clause. 1 4 This provision of the New Jersey Plan,
unlike many others, actually made it into the Constitution. After further
efforts by Madison to obtain support for the congressional veto failed, 1 '
the Convention rejected the restricted congressional veto previously approved by the Committee of the Whole House, which would have permitted a federal negative on all laws contravening, in the opinion of the
Congress, the articles of union.1 1 6 In place of the congressional veto, the
modern Supremacy Clause was unanimously adopted."1 One last attempt to insert a congressional veto, this time permitting a federal negative on state laws by a two-thirds vote of both houses, also failed. Roger
Sherman pointed out that because the Supremacy Clause was in the Constitution, the congressional veto was unnecessary to protect federal inter18
ests from state encroachment.
Thus the Convention explicitly adopted the Supremacy Clause as an
alternative to the congressional veto, because (1) it was concerned that
Congress might abuse the congressional veto, and (2) it was confident
that the Supremacy Clause would ensure that state judges enforced federal law. Gouverneur Morris insinuated that under the Supremacy
Clause, the business of sorting out conflicts between federal and state
laws would belong to the judges, not Congress."' 9 But preemption doctrine gives Congress a power very similar to, yet broader than, the one
the Convention rejected. The congressional veto would have permitted
Congress to strike down, after the fact, particular laws passed by the
states. Preemption permits Congress to block off whole areas of legislation and say to the states, "Here you shall not enter."
Admittedly, Congress can preempt state regulation only in those
fields of legislation where C6ngressi can cdnstitutionally operate pursuant
28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982), and by the lower federal courts through the exercise of their jurisdiction to hear cases arising under the Constitution and their power to enjoin the enforcement of
unconstitutional state laws, see Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
It may not have been apparent to Madison that either of these routes would be available.
Gouverneur Morris suggested precisely the regime that has actually developed: "A law that
ought to be negatived will be set aside in the Judiciary departm[en]to and if that security
should faill may be repealed by a Nation[a]lD law." 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 107, at 28.
114. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 107, at 245. The New Jersey Plan originally gave the
federal executive the power to compel the states' obedience to federal law through military
force.
115. See Iid. at 363, 447; 2 id. at 27-28.
116. 2 id. at 21-22.
117. 2 id. at 28-29.
118. 2 id. at 390-91.
119. See supra note 113.
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to its enumerated powers. Nonetheless, an attempt to distinguish between the congressional veto rejected by the Framers and the preemption
doctrine in force today along enumerated-powers lines fails because the
limitations on congressional power set forth in Article I, Section 8 are
practically no limitations at all. The expansive interpretation of the federal commerce power prevailing since United States v. Darby 120 makes it
very unlikely that the courts will strike down any exercise of Congress'
commerce power as beyond Congress' enumerated powers. Combined
with the broad reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause established
by Chief Justice Marshall, 2 ' congressional power under the Commerce
122
Clause includes the power to prohibit the states from enacting laws.
Congress now exercises a power that the Framers probably intended
to deny it. There is considerable support for the view that the expansion
of Congress' commerce power was essential to enable some part of the
government to address commercial problems that are national in scope,
and thus beyond the power of the states to regulate effectively,' 2 3 and yet
124
not so national in nature as to demand regulation by Congress alone.
But even if the courts are not prepared to deny that Congress has the
power to preempt state legislation, they can still play a large role in preserving the federal structure by fashioning a doctrine that minimizes conflicts between the federal government and the states.
120. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
121. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
122. This distinction between congressional veto and preemption doctrine also bears an
eerie resemblance to the unconvincing contrast drawn by Justice Rehnquist in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), between preemption doctrine and the Tenth Amendment. In NationalLeagueof Cities,the federal government argued that the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and municipal
governments infringed state sovereignty no more than the preemption of state regulation of the
private sector already upheld by the Supreme Court. Justice Rehnquist responded:
It is one thing to recognize the authority of Congress to enact laws regulating individual businesses necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the government of the
Nation and of the State in which they reside. It is quite another to uphold a similar
exercise of congressional authority directed, not to private citizens, but to the States
as States.
426 U.S. at 845. These two sentences overlook the point that many congressional statutes do
regulate the States as States, because they oust not only state laws that conflict with federal
laws, but any state regulation at all. For example, ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982 and
Supp. 1985), preempts "any and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). This section of ERISA does expressly what
all preemption provisions must do: it prohibits state laws. The Supremacy Clause, as interpreted by Justice Rehnquist in National League of Cities, merely provides a defense against
existing state regulations that actually conflict with federal regulations.
123. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 581, 583-85 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
124. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
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Divided and Concurrent Powers

The Framers probably did not expect that the simultaneous operation of congressional and state power would lead to as many conflicts,

real or alleged, as appear in modem preemption cases. In The Federalist,
at least, they indicated a belief that Congress and the states would respect
a sharp division between their spheres of authority.12 5 First, they felt
that many of the powers delegated to Congress belonged to Congress
alone. The Framers believed that it was inappropriate for the states to
exercise the war power or the foreign affairs power, 2 6 or power over
currency.127 Modern cases have added fields such as immigration12 8 and
admiralty 2 9 to the list of areas in which the states are largely precluded
from acting. Second, the Framers probably did not have the current,
broader understanding of Congress' commerce power. The authors of
The Federalistdiscussed the commerce power very little, apparently assuming that the necessity of congressional regulation of interstate mat130
ters was widely recognized.
In the field of taxation, however, all agreed that the Constitution
permitted concurrent federal and state regulation.' 3 ' The AntiFederalists strenuously opposed Congress' power to tax the people directly.1 32 The Articles of Confederation had required Congress to rely
on the states' supply of funds for the national treasury.' 33 The Anti125. THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (A. Hamilton), No. 41 (J. Madison), No. 46 (J. Madison).
But see Carey, supra note 106, at 33 (arguing that Madison believed the boundary between
federal and state authority "would be worked out over time" and "could be altered").
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; [or] grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal"); THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 258-59 (J.
Madison) (dangers of constituent states of confederacies having military power); THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 281 (J. Madison).
127. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("No State shall... coin Money; emit Bills of Credit ..
see also THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 280-81 (J. Madison).
128. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1982).
129. See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 221, 227-29 (1986); G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 1-17, at 48 (2d ed. 1975).
130. See THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 293 (J. Madison). Madison's notes state that the
"Clause for regulating commerce with foreign nations &c. [was] agreed to nem. con." 2 M.
FARRAND, supra note 107, at 308. If the clause Madison referred to above is the same clause
that appears in Madison's copy of the Committee of Detail's report, 2 id. at 181, it included the
"interstate" commerce clause. Certainly the records of the Convention demonstrate nothing
resembling the furor that erupted over the proposal to prohibit duties on exports from the
states. See 2 id. at 306-07, 359-63.
131. See 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
333, 399-403, 413-14, 416 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds. 1981); THE FEDERALIST Nos. 31,
32, 33 (A. Hamilton).
132. "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises . . . ." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.; see sources cited supra note 131.
133. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATON art. VIII (1777).
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Federalists argued that Congress could, by combining its taxing power
with its necessary and proper clause power, simply prohibit the states
from imposing their own taxes and thus endanger the very existence of
134
the states.
Hamilton particularly appreciated the force of this argument, for he
understood that the taxing power was essential to any effective government. Hamilton argued that the lack of any congressional taxing power
had been a chief cause of Congress' weakness under the Articles of Confederation.'
To refute the Anti-Federalist argument that the Necessary
and Proper Clause gave Congress the power to override all constitutional
limitations on its authority, including limitations inherent in the federal
structure, Hamilton (and perhaps Madison) suggested, albeit in a
whisper, that the courts would stand ready to prevent Congress from
eroding the sovereignty of the states.136 If the courts did not enforce the
constitutional limits, the people and the states could force Congress to
respect the proper boundaries of federalism through their influence on
senatorial and presidential elections.1 37 Although Hamilton never specified what exercises of the taxing power by Congress might violate state
sovereignty, he accepted the idea that the power was limited.
Today the boundary between most federal and state powers more
closely resembles the elusive line that the authors of The Federalist attempted to draw between federal and state taxing powers than the clear
line that the Framers confidently drew between federal and state powers
in other spheres of operation. Three factors have made the division between the federal and state powers indeterminate. The most important
factor is the vast expansion of the congressional commerce power, as interpreted by the courts and exercised by Congress. Second, the expansion of congressional power has been accompanied by a judicially blessed
expansion of the states' commerce power, as the courts have abandoned
both constitutional limits placed on the states by the Due Process
134. See supra note 131.
135. THE FEDERALIST No. 21, at 140-43 (A. Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 195
(A. Hamilton).
136. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 34, at 204 (A. Hamilton) ("These acts will be merely
acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as such."); THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 28687 (J. Madison) (success of congressional usurpation of state powers would depend on compliance of executive and judiciary, "which are to expound and give effect to the legislative acts");
see also Van Alstyne, Federalism, Congress, the States, and the Tenth Amendment: Adrift in
the Cellophane Sea, 1987 DUKE L.J. 769, 774 (arguing that in THE FEDERALIST No. 78,
Hamilton implied the availability of judicial review to protect the federal structure).
137. THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 197 (A. Hamilton); accordTHE FEDERALIST No. 45, at
290-91 (J. Madison); THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 296-97 (J. Madison).
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Clause13 and formalistic doctrines restricting the states to regulation of
purely local commerce.139 Modem commerce clause cases emphasize
discrimination against interstate commerce and balancing of interests instead of older technical distinctions such as interstate/intrastate,
direct/indirect, or retail/wholesale."4 Today the states are more free to
legislate in areas where federal law has always operated.
The ratification debates surprisingly did not presage the simple truth
that even when the federal government operates within the most restricted understanding of its field of power, its regulations may conflict or
nearly conflict with state regulations that are also legitimate exercises of
state power. What is an army regulation to the federal government, is an
exercise of the domestic relations power to the states.' 4 1 What the federal government sees as an immigration law, the states may view as employment regulation.14 What falls within the federal admiralty power is
143
also covered by the states' wrongful death statutes.
But rather than acknowledge that the federal government and the
states share regulatory authority in several areas, the Supreme Court has
tried to separate the two with preemption doctrine." 4 The Court has
138. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (overruling Adkins v.
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525-29 (1934).
139. See Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 39091 (1983) (overruling Public Utils. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83
(1927)).
140. See Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp., 461 U.S. at 393-94; Dep't of Revenue v. Ass'n of
Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 748-50 (1978) (overruling Puget Sound Stevedoring Co.
v. State Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 90 (1937)); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S.
274, 280-81 (1977) (overruling Spector Motor Serv. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951)). But cf
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982) (plurality opinion by White, J.)(Commerce
Clause prohibits "direct regulation" of interstate commerce by states). See generally Regan,
Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine; (II) ExtraterritorialState Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1875 (1987) (arguing
that Justice White "cannot mean to resurrect the old 'direct/indirect' test in all its obscure
generality").
141. See Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981) (Maine decree establishing constructive
trust on proceeds of serviceman's life insurance policy for benefit of ex-wife and children is
preempted by Servicemens' Group Life Insurance Act).
142. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (California statute prohibiting employer
from knowingly employing undocumented aliens not preempted by Immigration and Nationality Act).
143. See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986) (application of Louisiana wrongful death statute to helicopter crash 35 miles offshore preempted by Death on the
High Seas Act).
144. For analysis tracking the Court's error, see Note, supra note 8, at 1234 (arguing that
"the Court appears more willing to preempt state law in areas involving traditionally strong
federal concerns than in areas involving traditional uses of state power"); id. at 1238 (Burger
Court likely to uphold state law when subject matter of case involves "particularly local interests"). Most commentary misses the idea that a case could implicate both strong federal con-
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further complicated preemption doctrine by articulating the presumption
that federal statutes do not impinge on "essential" and "traditional" state
interests such as health and safety regulation,' 4 5 utility regulation,14 6 tort

law,147 and domestic relations law.14 The Supreme Court has said, for
damage" to
example, that state domestic relations law must do "major
49
federal interests before it will be held to be preempted.
At first, such a presumption seems like a good idea. In certain areas
of law the states, not the federal government, still do most of the regulating. PYet the Supreme Court's list of essential and traditional state interests is so long that it may not actually exclude anything. 5 ° Nor is there
any reason for preemption doctrine to pick and choose among state interests. The Tenth Amendment' left to the states all the powers not delegated to Congress. Federal courts are not competent to judge which
1 52
among those powers are more highly prized by the states themselves.
cerns and particularly local interests. See, eg., id. at 1240 & n.40, discussing Rice v. Norman
Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654 (1982), and noting that "California had a legitimate interest" in the
case. Was there really no strong federal interest implicated, as the commentator suggests?
The case involved the Sherman Act.
145. See Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Labs, 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985).
146. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 205 (1983).
147. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 255 (1984).
148. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979).
149. Id.; see also Note, A Frameworkfor Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363 (1978)
(applauding Supreme Court doctrine that distinguishes between state laws protecting citizens
from physical harm and other state laws, and affords greater deference to former).
150. Cf Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (implying that relative importance of law to state is irrelevant for preemption purposes).
151. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend.
X.
152. A recent casualty of the Court's flawed approach is Michigan's attempt to regulate the
issuance of securities by natural gas companies. Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 108 S.Ct.
1145 (1988). The Court held Michigan's statute preempted because it intruded on the comprehensive federal regulation of natural gas sales under the Natural Gas Act of 1938, which gave
federal regulators de facto power to approve or disapprove the capital structures of natural gas
companies. Id. at 1151-52. The Schneidewind Court had to address Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947), in which the Court upheld Illinois' regulation of securities issued
by grain elevator companies, even though the United States Warehouse Act comprehensively
regulated facilities, rates, and services of grain elevators. 331 U.S. at 237. The Schneidewind
Court distinguished Rice by arguing that the regulation of natural gas companies, unlike the
regulation of grain elevators, was not an area traditionally occupied by the states. See
Schneidewind, 108 S.Ct. at 1156 n.13 (quoting Rice, 337 U.S at 230). Why should it matter
whether states had "traditionally" occupied the field? States are free to experiment in regulating new areas, as long as they do not contravene the Commerce Clause or other constitutional
strictures. "The states must be... free to engage in any activity that their citizens choose for
the common wealth.... Any rule of state immunity that looks to the 'traditional,' 'integral,'
or 'necessary' nature of government functions inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary
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Indeed, the states may differ on what they believe to be their essential
interests. Moreover, a distinction between essential and nonessential interests is not necessary to keep the states within their proper spheres of
authority. If the states attempt to exercise powers in areas where they
have no legitimate interest, such as foreign affairs, the courts do not have
to rely on preemption doctrine to conclude that such state regulation
must be prohibited. The text and structure of the Constitution ensure
that the states may not encroach on those areas reserved for Congress.
When a legitimate state regulation touches on a matter also governed by a power that the Framers intended to be exclusively federal,
such as military power or power over immigration matters, there is a
strong case for taking the federal, not the state, point of view. Even
when it is a state domestic relations rule that impairs the effectiveness of
a federal army regulation, the preemption analysis should be no different
than it would be if the state law were an environmental statute. In such
cases, it is the federal interest that warrants protection. On the other
hand, because the Constitution demonstrates no preference for federal
exclusiveness in the fields of banking, x" 3 environmental protection, or labor law, the courts should be more concerned with the continued vitality
of state regulation in those areas. There are two types of federal powers:
exclusive and nonexclusive. Preemption doctrine should reflect this
dichotomy.
C. Preemption and Politics
If preemption doctrine is to serve the goals of federalism, it should
secure to both the federal government and the states the right to regulate
in their proper fields of authority. Where both Congress and the states
operate legitimately, the states' role as laboratories for regulatory innovation makes the protection of state regulatory authority particularly important.154 The federal structure allows us to experiment before we
impose what could be a massive mistake on the country as a whole. Acto make decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes." Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985).
Another case decided the same Term as Schneidewind suggests, however, that the Court
realizes the error of this "traditional" function approach. "'Tihe relative importance to the
state of its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law,' for 'any
state law, however clearly within a state's acknowledged power, which interferes with or is
contrary to federal law, must yield.'" Felder v. Casey, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 2306 (1988) (quoting
Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962)).
153. But cf U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (prohibiting states from coining money, emitting bills
of credit, or making anything other than gold and silver legal tender).
154. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 282, 309-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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tivists and reformers have proposed so many different approaches to welfare reform, environmental pollution, medical care for the elderly, and
the protection of shareholders that we rightly pause before deciding that
one rule is appropriate for the entire country.
Local governments can also be more creative, more responsive to
grievances voiced by the people, and less susceptible to elitism and bureaucratic inertia than the federal government.15 5 The virtues of local
government are not overtly disputed by any Justice on the Supreme
Court today, but rival theories have emerged concerning the proper role
of the courts in protecting the federal structure. The NationalLeague of
Cities v. Usery 5 6 majority saw an active role for the courts, through the
exercise of judicial review, in interpreting the Tenth Amendment as a
substantive limit on congressional power interfering with state regulation. The majority in Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority,1 57 which overruled National League of Cities, believed that the
proper safeguards of federalism were established in the political
branches, through the representation of the states in the Senate and
through the states' role in electing the President.'5 8 The dissenters in
Garcia did not doubt that Congress should play an important role in
preserving the line between state and federal authority. They argued,
however, that the courts were also authorized to protect the states, and
that judicial review was becoming ever more important because the rise
of national interest-group politics and the adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment"5 9 had made the Senate less responsive to the legitimate in160
terests of the states.
A reformed preemption doctrine would unite these two approaches.
It would accept that Congress has the power to oust state legislation if
such ouster is necessary and proper for the exercise of a federal power.
At the same time, it would recognize that the judiciary has a role in
155. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 576-77 (1985) (Powell,
J.,
dissenting); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 894 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting). But
Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 23 (A. Hamilton) (noting superior energy of federal government to
address national issues).
156. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
157. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
158. See id. at 551 & n. 11 (citing Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism: The
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L.

REv. 543 (1954)).
159. U.S. CONST. amend XVII (senators to be elected by people of each state; superseding
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, providing for election of senators by state legislatures).
160. See Garcia,469 U.S. at 565 n.9 (Powell, J.,
dissenting); cf THE FEDERALIST No. 46,
at 296 (. Madison) (members of Congress unlikely to encroach on state prerogatives because
they will "attach themselves too much to local objects" and will pass measures based on
"prejudices, interests, and pursuits" of the individual states).
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ensuring that Congress face up to the political consequences of upsetting
the status quo balance of powers between the federal government and the
states. Greater judicial skepticism about congressional intent to preempt
state authority in any particular statute would provoke more clear articulations by. Congress of such intent. Then, if the people dislike the drift of
authority- from the states to the federal government, they can vote
appropriately. 161
Preemption doctrine has two basic flaws that prevent it from protecting the federal-state balance: (1) interpretation of congressional intent
in terms of objectives that may be hindered by the state law in question,
and (2) leniency in finding state laws preempted by administrative agency
regulations. As noted earlier, the courts usually analyze preemption
cases in terms of the effect of the state law on the operation of the federal
162
scheme rather than the intent of Congress to displace state authority.

Courts state that they analyze congressional intent, but often they consider the general purpose of the relevant federal statute instead of the
specific intent to displace the states., Congressional "intent" is analyzed
as if the states did not exist, and the state law is then placed in opposition
to that intent. This kind of analysis is only appropriate if there is an
actual conflict between state and federal law, if the state requires something that the federal government prohibits, or vice versa. Such cases are
rare and easy to decide.163 Preemption cases present no actual conflict.
Most preemption opinions first characterize the goal of the federal statute broadly and then decide whether the state statute moves in the opposite direction (in nonbalancing cases) or any direction at all (in balancing
cases). 164

The result is usually a sweeping but dissatisfying statement about
161. See THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 286 (J. Madison); cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at
197 (A. Hamilton) (in conflict between states and federal government, states are likely to jrevail because states possess greater influence over -the people).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 101-03.
163. For example, the Supreme Court ruled in Rose v. Arkansas State Police, 479 U.S. 1
(1986), that the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act requiring state workers' compensation
for public employees to be offset by any benefits obtained from the federal government, conflicted with a federal statute conferring death benefits on state law-enforcement officers killed
in the line of duty and explicitly stating that such death benefits were in addition to any compensation from the state. The state statute thus attempted to do what the federal statute prohibited the state from doing, reducing the state compensation by the amount of the federal
compensation.
164. While preemption under a theory of express or implied preemption is essentially
a matter of statutory construction, preemption under a frustration of federal purposes theory is more an exercise in policy choices by a court than strict statutory
construction. An independent judgment that federal purposes require preemption
comes in the face of congressional silence, both express and implied on the subject.
Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1113 (4th Cir. 1988).
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the purposes of a federal statute. 165 For example, in Pacific Gas & Electric 166 and Silkwood, 167 the parties challenging the state laws contended
that they frustrated the Atomic Energy Act's purpose of developing the
widespread commercial use of nuclear power.1 68 The Court could not
deny that Congress wanted to encourage development of nuclear power
through the Atomic Energy Act but concluded that Congress did not
intend the promotion of nuclear power to be accomplished "at all
costs."'1 69 Indeed, the Atomic Energy Act explicitly states that its goal is
to achieve the maximum promotion of nuclear power consistent with
public safety, and it is inconceivable that Congress" would intend that
nuclear power be promoted without any regard for the costs. 1 70 Yet
Silkwood and Pacific Gas & Electric tell us nothing about Congress' intent to preempt state laws, and in particular they tell us nothing about
which costs are to be assessed or at which level of government they are to
be assessed. The Court tossed off an ill-conceived and snappy depiction
of Congress' intent that is certain to haunt it in the future.
Similarly dissatisfying is the Court's resolution of the "delicate balance" case of Michigan Canners.17 In that case, the Court held the state
law preempted because it required farmers to abide by the terms negotiated by agricultural cooperative associations, whereas a federal statute
had given the farmers the right to join such cooperatives but had prohibited any coercion of farmers to join.' 72 The Court did not rely on a finding of congressional intent to preempt state legislation. 1 73 The federal
165. See supra text following note 89; see also Felder v. Casey, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 2317, 2319
(1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing Court's vague discussion of policies behind federal civil rights laws). At times the Court seems to drift entirely from the intent of Congress by
discussing the purposes behind federal regulation. In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470 (1974), the Court engaged in a free-ranging examination of the nature and purpose of
federal patent law and state trade secret law. The opinion is filled with aphorisms but largely
empty of any consideration of Congress' preemptive intent. See id. at 493-95 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in result) (crucial issue is whether Congress intended to displace state law, not
possible tension between objectives of two regulatory schemes).
166. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
167. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
168. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 257; Pacific Gas & Elea, 461 U.S. at 220.
169. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 257; Pacific Gas & Elea, 461 U.S. at 222.
170. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 257 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2013(d) (1982)).
171. Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Marketing & Bargaining Bd., 467
U.S. 461 (1984).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 92-95.
173. The Court could have concluded that the Michigan statute directly conflicted with the
federal statute by construing the word "coerce" to include state action that made the contract
negotiated by the cooperative binding on all farmers. This interpretation would have been
problematic, however, because the statutory language made it unlawful for the producers'associations to coerce individual farmers.
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statute made no mention of the future viability of state regulation.1 74
The Court relied instead on its conclusion that Congress had established
a balance between bolstering producers' bargaining power and preventing abuse of power by the producers' unions. Following the legislative
history, the Court interpreted the objective of the statute as protecting
the producers' "free choice." 17 5 The Michigan statute contravened this
very vague formulation of the congressional policy and thus fell, despite
Congress' failure to indicate any intent to displace state law.
The outcomes of balancing cases such as Michigan Canners are appealing because of their common-sense approach to regulation as a bargain among competing interests. Notwithstanding the Court's uplifting
talk about freedom from coercion in Michigan Canners, one suspects that
the statutory language is actually the result of a pitched political struggle
between farmers and food processors. Perhaps the balance struck by
Congress does deserve deference. But when the Court interprets this balance as having preemptive effect on state regulations, without relying on
any clear statement of congressional intent to preempt state law, it encourages Congress to proceed in a troublesome fashion. The Court encourages Congress to fool the adversary political interests by avoiding
statutory language about preemption. If, in passing the Agricultural Fair
Practices Act, Congress really did intend to set the final terms for a truce
between farmers and food processors, it should have thought about the
possibility that the parties would turn to the states for additional ammunition. Certainly the parties knew that state legislatures offered them another possible theater of conflict. By avoiding preemptive language in
the federal statute, Congress may have been trying to hoodwink the lobbyists into thinking that the federal statute was, or was not, the final
word on the matter.
Congress may also have been trying to avoid resolution of a difficult
issue. Avoiding difficult issues is part of politics, but the Supreme Court
ought not encourage this kind of politics. The Court should be especially
chary of encouraging games played at the cost of the integrity of the
federal system. When Congress enacts a statute that balances adverse interests without mentioning preemption, it not only fails to address the
lasting effect of the statute on the parties; it also ignores the statute's
effect on the states. Congress thus evades the checks against its own aggrandizement that are built into the Constitution.
The Senate and the President are supposed to guard the states' interests and the people's interest in maintaining viable state governments.
174. See 467 U.S. at 469.
175. See id. at 470.
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By inferring preemptive intent, cases such as Michigan Canners undermine the ability of the Senate and the President to ensure that the federal
government does not assume sole responsibility for all the important regulatory decisions in our society. These cases also undermine the ability
of the people to perceive and17 judge
the drift of authority to the federal
6
government from the states.
The second basic flaw of the preemption doctrine is the Court's lenient attitude toward the preemptive effect of administrative agency regulations. The problem occurs when the agency, operating under a general
organic statute, takes upon itselfthe decision to preempt state laws. The
Court has tended to view this issue as one of administrative law. If the
administrator's decision to preempt state law is not inconsistent with the
177
underlying statute, then the Court will uphold it.
As a result, administrative agencies can preempt state laws without
considering the political consequences to the states. In fact, the Court
has held that administrative agencies do not even have to consider alternatives less disruptive of state authority when deciding whether to preempt state laws. 17 8 Yet administrative agency officials, not subject to
electoral constraints on their exercise of power, are even less likely to
consider the consequences to the states than are members of Congress.
Agency officials are unelected and thus not immediately answerable to
popular sentiment. Unlike members of Congress, most probably have
not worked their way up state political ladders and thus lack the familiarity with the corpusjurisof state regulation that assists members of Congress in deciding whether federal intervention in a particular problem is
necessary and proper.
The cost to federalism is evident from Fidelity Federal Savings &
Loan Association v. De La Cuesta. 7 9 That case involved a clash between
California's populist doctrine sharply limiting the enforceability of dueon-sale clauses in real estate mortgages and a federal regulation explicitly
176. Very few among the electorate may monitor the general drift of authority from the
federal government to the states. It is very likely, however, that interest groups such as unions,
corporations;

and

environmentalist

organizations

(to name

only

three)

monitor the

federal/state balance closely and then attempt to use their prestige and financial resources to
inform and influence the electorate.
177. See, e.g., City of New York v. FCC, 108 S.Ct. 1637, 1642 (1988) (FCC preemption of
state technical standards governing cable television signals); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v.-Crisp,
467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984) (FCC preemption of state power to censor cable television signals);
Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982) (Federal Home
Loan Bank Board preemption of state law governing due-on-sale clauses in residential real
estate mortgages).
178. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 154.
179. 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
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authorizing the inclusion of due-on-sale clauses in. mortgage contracts
written by federal savings and loan associations. 8 ° The Court hesitated
to find a direct conflict between the two doctrines, because the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board had not required federal savings and loans to
insert due-on-sale clauses in their mortgages. Thus, the states were not
prohibiting something that the federal government had mandated."'8 Instead, the Court relied on the agency's express decision that due-on-sale
practices of federal savings and loan banks should be governed solely by
federal law.'" 2 As a result, California's controversial innovation in restricting due-on-sale clauses was terminated only four years after the California Supreme Court had decided to try the doctrine.
Preemption doctrine's current inadequacies stem from the Court's
failure to recognize the link between preemption and the Constitution
and to grasp the fundamental issues of allocation of power implicated in
preemption cases. Reformed preemption doctrine should make both the
federal government and the states more secure in their appropriate fields
of regulation. To do so, preemption doctrine must recognize'(1) that the
states may regulate in any area from which they are not excluded by the
Constitution; (2) in areas where the states may legislate, the Constitution
intends that Congress weigh and consider carefully any displacement of
state authority; and (3) in areas reserved to federal authority, Congress
need not give the states' interests the same consideration; for it may assume that only the federal government operates legitimately in that field.
If preemption doctrine were so reformed, with its link to the Constitution restored, it could preserve the states' authority without intruding
on Congress' power, when appropriately exercised, to displace the states.
Unchained from the Constitution, current preemption doctrine has the
formidable potential to stifle regulatory creativity and innovation. Part
Three of this Article sets forth four proposals to avoid this consequence
by restoring the link between preemption and federalism.
180. Id. at 146 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) (1982)), 149 (citing Wellenkamp v. Bank of
Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 582 P.2d 970 (1978)).I
181. 458 U.S. at 155 ("compliance with both § 545.8-3(f) and the Wellenkamp rule may
not be 'a physical impossibility' ").
182. Id. at 159.
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III. Rstoring the Link
A.

The courts should recognize that some federal interests are more
important than others and accordingly should give federal
statutes in certain fields greater preemptive force
than in others.

As suggested in Part Two, although the Framers expected Congress
and the states to respect a clear division of their fields of authority, the
expansion of the federal commerce power has eliminated the possibility
of drawing that boundary today. 1 83 That Congress has a vast but legitimate power to regulate commerce need not mean, however, that the exercise of this power has the same preemptive force as the exercise of
other federal powers. The power to regulate commerce surely does not
require exclusive federal control, as do powers such as coinage and war,
over which supreme federal authority is so essential that the Framers
largely divested the states of authority. Sole federal control over the
outer reaches of the commerce power, as it is understood today, is not
essential to the structure of the nation. When Congress reaches beyond
its power over purely interstate commerce to regulate matters merely
"affecting" commerce, it must know that it will run into the whole array
of legitimate state regulation. The very existence of that state regulation
hardly threatens our country's ability to hang together.
There are several ready objections to the development of a two-tier
preemption doctrine. First, our legal culture has conditioned courts to
avoid making constitutional law whenever it is unnecessary to do so.' 8 4
A two-tier preemption doctrine would require courts to decide first
whether a congressional statute implicated a "heavy" federal interest or a
"light" federal interest and would thus create an entirely new layer of
constitutional law. Indeed, the very idea of courts deciding that some
federal powers are more important than others may make some uneasy.
Yet, despite this objection, a two-tier system would cure some of the
uncertainty produced by current preemption doctrine, which has
prompted courts to give too little preemptive effect to the most important
federal interests and too much preemptive effect to others. Operating
without a rule that immigration was of overarching federal concern, the
Supreme Court decided that the states were free to prohibit the employment of undocumented aliens.18 Conversely, the Court might not have
held Vermont's common-law nuisance rule preempted had it more
183. See supra text accompanying notes 138-40.
184. See, eg., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48, 354-55 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
185. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
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clearly recognized concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over environmental regulation. 186 Furthermore, an explicit recognition that some

federal interests are more weighty than others is an improvement over
the Court's current practice of (1) stating that some state powers are
superior to others, and (2) failing to identify any state powers as inferior. 187 If the roll of superior state powers includes such disparate functions as utility regulation,18 8 inspection of foodstuffs, 1 89 corporate
governance, 190 and minimum labor standards, 19' we 92can safely conclude
that no legitimate state powers are not on this list.'
The second objection to a two-tier preemption doctrine is that the

federal courts might mistakenly identify an interest as overwhelmingly
federal and thus oust the states from an area where they ought to operate. For example, the Supreme Court has identified admiralty law as an
area where federal interests are paramount. 1 93 This conclusion appears
tenuous because the power to create substantive rules of maritime law is
not among the delegated powers of Article I, Section 8.19' The states'
wrongful death statutes are among the casualties of this possibly unsound
186. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. 806 (1987).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 144-50.
188. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,
205 (1983).
189. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144 (1963).
190. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1647 (1987).
191. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756-57 (1985).
192. Arguably, the Supreme Court already claims to use such a two-tier approach. The
Court's boilerplate preemption test, see supra note 12, states that a congressional intent to
preempt state law may be inferred when the statute "may touch on a field in which the federal
interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude the enforcement of
state laws on the same subject." Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983). The Supreme Court has not explicitly relied
on this particular part of the test in any recent case. The Court has indicated that it is more
willing to infer preemption in certain fields such as immigration, see Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S.
1 (1982), and admiralty, see Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986). However, in California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co., 107 S. Ct. 1419 (1987), the majority opinion did not respond to Justice Powell's dissenting suggestion that as the federal
regulations were enacted pursuant to the Property Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, the Court
should be less concerned about preserving the states' authority. More importantly, even if the
Court does on occasion realize that it is dealing with a particularly weighty federal interest, in
other cases it should realize that lighter federal interests, not requiring the same protection
from the states, are presented.
193. Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986).
194. See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 1-17, § 1-7 (2d
ed. 1975). Compare Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 558 (1973) (even though Copyright
Clause is among enumerated powers in art. I, § 8, copyright power is not so fundamentally
national that states are prohibited from granting quasi-copyright protection to recordings) with
id. at 573-75 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Copyright Clause placed in Constitution principally to
ensure uniformity, which additional state regulation undermines).
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jurisprudence.19 5 The Supreme Court might also decide that the federal
power over antidiscrimination law was essential to the structure of the
nation and thus preempt most state protection against race and sex
discrimination.1 96
The Supreme Court may make mistakes, perhaps even egregious

ones. In this area of constitutional law, however, the results of such mistakes are less devastating than in others, for Congress can always override the Supreme Court's decision to preempt the states. Because the
Supremacy Clause protects congressional interests, Congress can waive
its claim to paramount authority and give the states the freedom needed

for operation, much as it has done in exempting state banking and insurance regulations from the strictures of the dormant Commerce Clause. 197
Thus the Court's treatment of preemption as an issue of pure statutory
construction offers no particular advantage. Congress, not the Supreme
19 8
Court, will always have the final say under either approach.

195. See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, .477 U.S. 207 (1986) (Louisiana wrongful
death statute preempted by federal Death on the High Seas Act).
196. Cf California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987); Colorado
Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 372 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1963) (applying
"floor, not ceiling" reasoning to antidiscrimination laws).
197. See Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159 (1985); Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co v. Massachusetts, 470 U.S. 867, 880 (1985).
198. Justice Scalia may have been.attempting, in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108
S. Ct. 2510 (1988), to create a two-tier preemption doctrine along these lines and to establish a
unified theory of preemption explaining the Court's cases both in areas involving concurrent
federal and state powers and in areas of "unique federal concern." See id. at 2515-16. Scalia
seeks to tie together the preemption cases discussed in this Article with another line of cases
concerning the displacement of state law by "federal common law." Cf United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977); United
States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
Scalia's unifying principle is that in all cases involving ouster of state law, there must be
"conflict" between federal and state law. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2516. Scalia is correct in that
many of the "federal common law" cases do engage in extensive discussion about the existence
vel non of conflicts between federal and state law; in some cases, this sounds like the "obstacle"
prong of preemption. See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. at 734-35;
United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. at 597. But, as discussed in this Article, it is highly debatable whether there is "conflict" in many preemption cases, unless one
stretches the term as Scalia does: "[T]o put the point differently, the fact that the area in
question is one of unique federal concern changes what would otherwise be a conflict that
cannot produce preemption into one that can." Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2515-16 (emphasis in
original). Morever, it is unclear whether Boyle itself turned on a "conflict" between federal
and state law. See id. at 2516-17 (extensive discussion of meaning of "significant conflict"). If
the case did turn on an actual conflict, then Scalia's elaborate analysis is unnecessary; if it did
not, then his analysis does not explain the "federal common law" cases.
Scalia also repudiates the entire analytic framework of the "federal common law" cases.
Under this framework the Court determined, first, whether federal or state law governed an
area, and second, whether a uniform federal law was necessary or whether federal law could
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B. Preemption doctrine should not do the work of the dormant
Commerce Clause in the name of "uniformity."
Preemption decisions talk a lot about "uniformity."

199

Those who

ask the courts to invalidate state laws point out the impediments that
diverse state laws place on free markets,2c ° or rational corporate planning,2 °1 or predictable collective bargaining, 20 2 or efficient transportation.20 3 Undoubtedly, uniformity is desirable in many fields. The
advantages of uniform railroad roadbeds for efficient transportation may
"borrow" the various state laws. See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. at
726-28; United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. at 592-95; Clearfield Trust Co.
v. United States, 318 U.S. at 367. The later cases in this line were greatly influenced by classic
articles such as Friendly, In Praiseof Erie--and of the New FederalCommon Law, 39 N.Y.U.
L. Rnv. 383 (1964), and Mishkin, The Variousness of "FederalLaw" Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REy. 797 (1957).
See, e.g., Little Lake Misere, 412 U.S. at 591, 593. Scalia dismisses this reasoning in a footnote,
scorning the idea that federal law would "deign" to borrow state law. Boyle, 108 S.Ct. at 2515
n.3.
Although an extensive discussion of Scalia's dicta is beyond the scope of this Article, it is
noteworthy that Scalia stumbles on one fundamental point. He combines several concepts in
an "upper tier" of cases touching on "unique federal concerns," but then he separates them
again, stating that in "some cases," the unique federal concern so requires a uniform federal
rule that the existence of any state law would pose a conflict, whereas in "others" (meaning
other cases) preemption occurs only when there is a more "narrow" conflict, and only "particular" elements of state law are superseded. Boyle, 108 S.Ct. at 2516.
It would be simpler to admit that in areas of "unique federal concerns," a conflict is not
required for the ouster of state law, but that in those areas, the Constitution precludes the
operation of state law unless Congress declares otherwise. Congress may decide that uniformity is not necessary for the protection of federal interests. This is precisely what Congress has
done in the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982) (state law governs liability of
federal government), a factor that makes the judicially created Feres doctrine, precluding liability of the federal government to members of the armed forces for service-related injuries, all
the more peculiar, as that doctrine relied crucially at its origin on the need for uniformity in
legal relations between the federal government and members of the armed forces. Compare
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 143-44 (1950) with United States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct.
2063, 2071-72 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Feres doctrine's uniformity rationale contradicted
by Congress' disavowal of uniformity as important factor in enacting FTCA). Admittedly, the
suggested analysis cannot be reconciled with the result in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,
460 U.S. 715 (1979), which holds that federal law governs priorities of consensual liens held by
the federal government, but that such federal law "borrows" the states' commercial codes even
in the absence of direction to borrow by Congress. More explicit "borrowing" instructions
would be needed under the presumption in favor of preemption required under "upper tier"
analysis.
199. See, e.g., Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 2217 (1987); International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 107 S.Ct. 805, 813-14 (1987); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 639 (1973).
200. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 127-28 (1978).
201. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 107 S.Ct. at 2216-20.
202. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985).
203. See Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Railroad Comm'n, 833 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1987).
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well be compelling. 2" Large corporations probably find it a great relief
that they need not obey fifty-one different laws regulating pension
plans.20 5 In these two cases, however, Congress has unambiguously spoken to eliminate state authority, and the courts do not have to'engage in
any analysis of the "delicate balance" effected by Congress to conclude
that federal law is supreme.
Even absent a federal statute, the Constitution itself may compel
uniformity in certain fields. A uniform national policy is highly desirable
in military matters, foreign affairs, currency regulation, indeed in all the
areas where the Constitution gave Congress exclusive authority. The
federal interest in efficient transportation of perishable goods also outweighs the various states' interests in parochial transportation regulations, such as the famous Illinois statute requiring trucks to use
contoured mudguards.2 °6
Outside the peculiar field of transportation, however,20 7 the dormant
Commerce Clause does not, in the name of uniformity, prohibit the states
from taking differing approaches to problems that, exist in every state.20 8
Nor is there a federal interest in uniformity that requires all goods and
services traded in interstate commerce to have immunity from state regulation. 20 9 "Uniformity,....
efficiency," "predictability, ' and "simplicity"
are euphemisms for complete disablement of state authority. "Uniformity" means exclusive federal power and state incapacity.
The Supreme Court has refrained from using the club of uniformity
against the states in dormant commerce clause cases. Yet preemption
doctrine, particularly the "delicate balance" theory, provides another opportunity for those who wish to be rid of burdensome state regulation to
raise the banner of uniformity. If the Court ignores the implications of
204. Id. at 573-74.
205. Cf Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 107 S.Ct. at 2216-20 (discussing policies
behind ERISA preemption).
206. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
207. See Regan, supra note 140, at 1883.
208. This statement excludes the transportation fields, such as shipping and railroads,
where the Supreme Court has shown a particular willingness to strike down state regulation as
imposing an excessive burden on interstate commerce. See Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Douglas v. Seacoast Products, 431
U.S. 265 (1977); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
209. One corporation brave (or brazen) enough to make such an argument astonished the
Supreme Court. See Exxon Corp. v..Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 127-28 (1978); see also
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S.Ct. 1637, 1649-50, 1652 (1987); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 136-37, 140 (1973). But cf Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1982) (plurality opinion by White, J.)(suggesting that
interstate nature of tender offers prohibited state regulation thereof).
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uniformity for the federal structure, it will permit preemption to do the
damage to federalism that the Court has otherwise tried to prevent
through its construction of the dormant Commerce Clause.
Rather than requiring a clear statement by Congress that state laws
are to be preempted, the Court has searched legislative history to find
congressional "anticipations" of uniformity,2 1 ° has combed complex reg-

ulatory structures for an implicit command for uniformity,211 and has
divined a need for uniformity from the nature of the subject.2 12 If the

Court must go to such lengths to find that uniformity is required by federal statutes, it is probably going farther than either Congress or the
President did. When the circumstances surrounding the passage of the
statute give little indication that Congress or the President perceived a
threat to state regulatory authority, the courts should not assist in dismantling this authority.
Awareness of preemption's role as a substitute for the Commerce
Clause in promoting uniformity also illuminates the most difficult preemption cases, the "licensing" cases. These cases typically involve a
clash between a state law and a federal regulation, under which the fed-

eral government has given a party a license or certificate to establish
compliance with federal standards. The ancestor of these "licensing"
cases is, of course, Gibbons v. Ogden.21 3
210. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 165-69 (1978) (holding Washington statute requiring safety features on oil tankers preempted by federal statute establishing
uniform regime controlling design of oil tankers, even though federal statute referred to "minimum standards of design").
211. See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. 805 (1987).
212. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209-10 (1985) (interpretation of
obligations imposed by labor contract to be governed by uniform federal law); Local 174,
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1962).
213. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Gibbons v. Ogden is a maddening case. It remains unclear whether the outcome rested on a simple theory of "collision" between the federal and
state statutes, id. at 210, or reflected Chief Justice Marshall's view that the commerce power
lay solely with Congress. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 24, § 6-3, at 404-05.
Perhaps Gibbons may be understood in light of the particular subject matter, not interstate commerce, but interstate transportation,particularly transportation on the navigable waters. The Court has tolerated little state interference with federal regulation of the navigable
waters. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); Douglas v. Seacoast
Products, 431 U.S. 265 (1977); First Iowa Hydro-elec. Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
But see Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). Perhaps, lurking
beneath Mr. Gibbons' steamship, was a federal interest of constitutional dimension in uniformity in interstate transportation. This interpretation of Gibbons recognizes that regulation of
transportation on the navigable waters is a field where the federal interest is supreme, like
military matters or immigration. Such an interpretation is preferable to the contorted one
emphasizing that Congress had given Gibbons a "license" to engage in the coasting trade. See
infra text accompanying note 214; Douglas v. Seacoast Products, 431 U.S. 265 (1977); Castle
v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61 (1954).
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Chief Justice Marshall is largely responsible for this difficulty, for he
emphasized the fact that Congress had granted Gibbons a license for the
coasting trade.2 14 Marshall interpreted "license" to mean an absolute
privilege or authority that the state cannot revoke. As a result, a very
peculiar situation emerges when the states attempt to impose their valid
regulatory laws on parties that have a federal "license" to undertake
some activity: the states can impose their laws, but they cannot interfere
with the effect of the federal license even for disobedience to the state
law. If, for example, the federal government grants someone a trucking
license and that person flagrantly and frequently breaks state highway
laws, the state can fine him or imprison him, but it cannot suspend his
right to use the highways.2 15
Gibbons and its progeny have probably relied too much on Chief
Justice Marshall's interpretation of "license" as a privilege that states are
powerless to restrict. The grant of a license need mean nothing more
than a certification that a party has complied with minimum federal standards. Unless Congress clearly indicates that compliance with federal
standards resulting in the issuance of a license makes compliance with
state laws unnecessary, there is no reason for the courts to suppose that
licensing implies uniformity. Moreover, when the Supreme Court discerns a congressional design to impose uniformity on the nation in the
mere existence of a complex licensing scheme as it did in Ouellette, it
infers something that Congress never intended. 16
C. Courts should require administrative agencies to explain why
preemption of state laws or uniformity of regulation is
necessary to promote a statutory purpose when that
determination is made.
Because "uniformity" and "efficiency" sound like technical values,
courts may overlook the political implications when these values are
raised in support of preemption. This danger is even greater when an
administrative agency does the preempting. Uniformity and efficiency
are often precisely the qualities that administrative agencies are supposed
to promote. On hearing that an administrative regulation promotes these
qualities, courts may instinctively decide that deference is required and
may miss the implications for federalism. A laudably uniform, efficient
214. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 211-12.
215. Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. at 64.
216. See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. 805 (1987); accordRay v. Atlantic
Richfield Corp., 435 U.S. 151, 165-66, 177 (1978)..
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communications system, for example, may not appear to pose a threat to
the legislative authority of the states.
Administrative agencies should promote uniformity and efficiency
when those qualities serve the regulatory purposes Congress intended the
agencies to achieve. An administrative decision to preempt state law
should not be regarded, however, as merely an issue of technical competence. Agency officials lack the political sensibilities of members of Congress and thus may not have the appropriate instinct for the need to
accommodate state interests. Indeed, if they are imbued with the spirit
of efficiency, administrators may tend to see centralization of power as a
good thing. It is hopelessly unrealistic to expect agency officials to be
sympathetic to the varied, even parochial, interests of the states.2 17
When Congress legislates, the states rely on the political safeguards
of federalism. These political safeguards are the equivalent of procedural
safeguards for the states' interests. Because so much of the task of regulating is done by administrative agencies today, the states need a similar
set of procedural safeguards in the administrative process that would
function to remind the agencies of the states' interests.
Perhaps no administrative safeguards can function as well as the
threat of impending elections that always faces members of Congress.
Nonetheless, the courts and Congress can require an agency to show it
has given serious consideration to the interests of the states before making a decision to preempt state authority. The agency should develop a
record demonstrating why preemption is advisable. Upon judicial review
of an agency's decision to preempt state law, courts should not be too
deferential to the agency's decision. 218 The necessity-for preemption is
not a technical matter in which administrative agencies have particular
expertise. If an agency cannot provide a reasonable explanation for the
necessity of preemption, the agency's decision should be vacated.
This considered decisionmaking could also clarify the agencies'
sometimes obscure objectives in pursuing particular courses. Consider,
for example, how the agency's clear statement of the purposes served by
preemption would have influenced the resolution in the Fidelity Federal
case.2 19 The Federal Home Loan Bank Board preempted state laws gov217. Many regulatory schemes enacted by Congress establish a division of authority between the federal government and the states. The lines dividing the spheres of authority are
not always bright, however, and occasionally the agencies tend to overstep them. See, eg.,
City of New York v. FCC, 814 F.2d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (split decision on FCC's authority to
preempt local regulation of cable television signal quality), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1637 (1988).
218. See City of New York v. FCC, 814 F.2d at 729-30 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
219. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982); see supra text
accompanying notes 179-82.
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erning the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses in residential real estate
mortgages, thus invalidating California's doctrine sharply limiting their
validity. The Board did not, however, require all savings and loan associations to place due-on-sale clauses in their mortgages. A rule requiring these clauses could have been easily justified in light of the Bank
Board's statutory mission to promote safe lending practices.2 2 ° Instead,
the Bank Board gave savings and loans the option of inserting due-onsale clauses without requiring them to do so.
The Bank Board may have simply assumed that most savings and
loans, given the proffered option, would take it. Nonetheless, we are left
wondering what approach to safe banking practices justified authorizing,
but not requiring, a particular contractual term. Normally, when the
federal government implicitly authorizes something by declining to prohibit it, the state may go "further" and prohibit the activity.2 2 1 This,
222
after all, is the essence of the "floor, not ceiling" theory of preemption.
Nor could the Bank Board's preemption decision be justified on the
ground that local banking conditions varied widely, so that individual
banks should have the right to decide for themselves whether a due-onsale clause was justified. When local conditions vary widely, the case for
preemption is significantly weakened. The states are better at addressing
local problems and assessing local conditions than the federal government, which usually takes the sweeping, national-interest perspective.
Perhaps the Bank Board was seeking to promote interstate banking
and thus wanted interstate savings and loans to be able to balance different risks faced in different parts of the country. None of this is apparent
from the Bank Board's proffered explanations, and the Supreme Court
demanded merely that the Bank Board's preemption decision not be inconsistent with the underlying statute. Courts should require more.
Agency officials, who are unconstrained by electoral influences and compelled in many cases to seek the most efficient, streamlined approach to a
problem, should provide explanations for decisions that eliminate state
laws.
D. The courts should require Congress to state its preemptive intent
expressly.
Earlier it was argued that preemption doctrine should take account
of the distinction between the powers granted exclusively to the federal
220. See 458 U.S. at 172-73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
221. See City of New York v. FCC, 814 F.2d at 729-30 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
222. See supra text accompanying notes 75-84.
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government and the powers that Congress shares with the states.2 23 The
line between these powers is not immutable. A primary purpose of vesting powers exclusively in the federal government is to protect the country's ability to speak with one voice; a congressional determination that
such uniformity is not necessary obviates the need for close scrutiny of
state laws. Congress could, for example, allow the states some authority
in foreign affairs by permitting them to prohibit contracts with South
African businesses. Under the federal immigration power, Congress
could authorize the states to prohibit the employment of undocumented
aliens. Under the federal admiralty power, Congress could authorize the
application of state wrongful death statutes.
These propositions are not controversial. More troubling is Congress' decision to move the line in the other direction by resolving that
federal interests require uniformity and thus prohibiting state legislation
in the areas of concurrent powers such as taxation, corporate law, and
labor regulation. Congress does precisely this when it expressly preempts
state legislation or when it purportedly occupies a field.
Even though these types of preemption resemble the congressional
veto of state laws rejected by the Framers, it is far too late to argue that
Congress does not have the power, under the Necessary and Proper
Clause, to prohibit state legislation. Nevertheless, although Congress has
the power to prohibit state legislation, the courts do not have to assist it
eagerly in doing so. This is not to suggest that the courts should scrutinize whether any particular preemption decision by Congress is necessary and proper. As both Chief Justice Marshall and the AntiFederalists pointed out, what is necessary and proper is a policy matter
more suitable for legislative than judicial decision.22 4
The courts can, however, simultaneously protect the political safeguards of federalism and afford the necessary deference to Congress by
requiring that Congress speak clearly and explicitly whenever it preempts
state legislation outside those areas that the Constitution reserves for
Congress alone. Preemption, after all, effects basic changes in the country's allocation of powers. When Congress occupied the field of butter
manufacture,2 2 5 for example, it essentially said, "Butter manufacture is
now as important to the federal government as national defense. Accordingly, further state regulation in the field of butter manufacture can223. See supra text accompanying notes 183-98.
224. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-19 (1819); 15 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 232, 514 (J.Kaminski & G. Saladino eds. 1981).
225. See Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942); supra text accompanying
notes 20-22.
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not be tolerated." When one hears the holding in Cloverleaf Butter
stated this way, one imagines that if Congress had wanted to preempt
state legislation in the field of butter manufacture, it would have said so.
Undoubtedly this "clear statement" requirement deprives Congress
and the courts of flexibility in protecting federal interests. Flexibility
may not be a particularly desirable quality in this area. The Supreme
Court has not tolerated flexibility in its eleventh amendment jurisprudence; the Court has required Congress to state clearly and explicitly
that it intends to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity.2 2 6 Flexibility
may also be on the retreat in separation of powers jurisprudence.2 27 Ju-

dicial staunchness seems more warranted for defending federalism than
separation of powers, for the states do not have political resources, like
those enjoyed by the President, to protect their interests against congressional intrusion.
Another possible objection to the "clear statement" rule is that it
may pressure the Court to turn to the Constitution and discover that
more federal powers are actually reserved to the federal government
rather than shared with the states. The Supreme Court might, for example, revive long-slumberiig doctrines prohibiting the states from "directly" regulating interstate commerce under a newfound awareness that
the Framers intended to exclude the states from this area.22 8
Outweighing these speculative disadvantages are the distinct advantages of a "clear statement" rule. Under this rule, although the courts
will still have to struggle with statutory language,2 2 9 they will be working
with an anchor holding them to Congress' preemptive intent. The courts
will also be playing some role in requiring Congress to deal honestly in
settling the expectations of those who are subject to regulation. By accepting a congressional power to make alterations in the nation's federal
structure but insisting that such changes be considered, honest, and ex226. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 235, 244-45 (1985).
227. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (invalidating automatic deficit-reduction
provision of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act as violating separation of powers); INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating legislative veto). But see Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597
(1988) (upholding independent counsel provision of Ethics in Government Act against separation of powers challenge).
228. See Regan, The Supreme Courtand State Protectionism:Making Sense of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 84 MicH. L. REV. 1091, 1280-81 (1986). As discussed supra text following
note 196, the Supreme Court may make mistakes. Yet state regulation affecting interstate
commerce is so entrenched today that, barring a complete victory by free-market disciples on
the issue of state regulation, judicial inertia in the face of both precedents and legislation will
probably prevent such a revolution. See generally Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the PoliticalProcess, 96 YALE L.J. 486 (1987).
229. See, e.g., Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 2216-19 (1987) (discussing whether state law at issue related to a benefit "plan").
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plicit, the "clear statement" rule offers the courts an opportunity to do
something, but not too much, to protect federalism.

Conclusion
Preemption doctrine has suffered as a stepchild of constitutional
law. Indeed, the doctrine's flaws suggest a lack of appreciation for preemption as a matter of constitutional dimension.2 30 Although, as this
Article suggests, claims of preemption implicate the most basic issues of
allocation of power under our federal system, 23 1 the courts have frequently proceeded as if preemption were solely a matter of a vague, illdefined intent of Congress and as if Congress operated in a vacuum,
without knowledge of the continued existence of the states.2 32 As a result, Congress has been able to exercise a power almost certainly denied
it by the Framers,2 33 administrative agencies have been able to circumvent the political safeguards of federalism, 2 34 and opponents of state regulation have been able to resist economic and social innovation.23 5
To avoid the damage to the federal system that preemption may
cause, the courts must restore the link between preemption and federalism. 236 They must understand that a claim of preemption suggests a considered decision by the federal government to prevent the states from
operating. in a field and thus affect a basic change in the allocation of
powers. Under the conceptions of federalism prevailing both now and at
the framing of the Constitution,2 3 7 such a decision is not to be taken
lightly by Congress, nor should it be treated lightly by the courts.
The current jurisprudence of preemption, with its willingness to accept "implicit" congressional decisions to preempt state laws, its excessive deference to administrative agencies' decisions to preempt the states,
and its credence of parties' claims that a federal scheme of regulation
requires uniformity to be workable, fails to protect the political and judicial safeguards of federalism.
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